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A Profile of Bio-pharma Consolidation Activity
Jordan Paradise, J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
The bio-pharmaceuticall sector is no stranger to consolidation. Over the
last three decades, over 110 companies have consolidated to approximately
thirty.2 Notably, the rate and extent of bio-pharmaceutical consolidation has
measurably accelerated in recent years with projections of a sinilar pace into
the near future. E rnst & Y oung reports that bi o-pharmaceutical deals reached
a ten-year high in 2014, when pharmaceutical companies acquired twenty-
seven biotech companies a 46 percent increase over 2013 numbers.4
Deloitte's 2015 outlook reveals that 'life sciences companies are expected to
continue expanding their presence in emerging markets through acquisitions
and joint ventures._s While the form, terms, and size of these deals- -whether
they are mergers, acquisitions, orjointventures--vary widely, they share the
overarching characteristic of changing the make-up of the entire industry.
Research and development priorities and product ownership will inevitably
shift as companies restructure, having an ultimate effect on consumers and
on the delivery of health care.
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Many thanks to Alexis Fede
for research assistance on the information provided in Table 3. This article was developed for
Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy-s
Ninth Annual Symposium on Access to Health Care, entitled Consolidation and its Impact on
Quality, Accessibility, and Cost of Care.
1. The terms 'bio-pharmaceutical_ and 'bio-pharma_ used in this article refer to
companies in the business of developing and/or marketing traditional chemical compounds
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as human drugs, human biologics
regulated by the FDA as biological products, or human drug-biologic combination products.
This article will also use the general term 'drug_ to refer to both human drugs and human
biologics approved by the FDA.
2. David Davidovic, The History of Bio-Pharrm Industry M&As, Lessons Learned and
Trends to Watch, PM360 (May 23, 2014), http://www.pm360online.comthe-history-of-bio-
pharma-i ndustry- mas- lessons-I earned-and-trends-to-watch/.
3. ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS: BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY REPORT 2015 1, 55
(2015), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY -beyond-borders-2015/$FILE /EY -
beyond-borders-2015.pdf.
4. Id.
5. DELOITTE, 2015 GLOBAL LIFE SCIENCES OUTLOOK: ADAPTING IN AN ERA OF
TRANSFORMATION 17 (2014), http://www2.deloitte.comcontent/dam/Deloitte/sg/Docum-ents/
life-sciences-health-care/sea-Ishc-2015-global-life-sciences-outlook-noexp.pdf.
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With increasing bio-pharmaceutical consolidation come questions about
whether and why the business model has changed for bi o-pharma, and how
such a change impacts access, cost quality, and innovation in the health and
medical realm Particularly timely is the question of whether bio-
pharmaceutical consolidation is enabling massive hikes in cost of both
prescription and generic drugs for health care consumers, health payors, and
the federal and state governments alike. Since 2008, prices for brand drugs
have increased a whopping 127 percent as compared to an 11 percent
consumer price index increase.6 Rapidly escalating prices for prescription
drugs such as Turing Pharmaceuticals- toxoplasmosis drug Daraprim
(pyrimethamine) and Valeant Pharmaceuticals- heart drugs Isuprel
(isoproterenol hydrochloride) and Nitropress (nitroprusside sodium) have
prompted widespread concern that mergers and acquisitions are facilitating
such rent-seeking behaviors in the marketplace.7 Congress is currently
investigating these drug-pricing scenarios, and the industry players
involved,' as many policymakers and presidential candidates call for changes
in the laws to address the problem'
Aside from the direct impact on medicine, health care, and drug costs
specifically, there are also important related questions about oversight of this
consolidation, and the level of control held by the federal government over
the scope and terms of these business deals. In an effort to examine the role
of the federal government, and specifically the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), in such oversight this article will explore bio-pharmaceutical
consolidation by reviewing select FT C actions and characterizing the features
and outcomes of the resulting mergers and acquisitions. The article first
briefly discusses several underlying drivers for bio-pharmaceutical
consolidation identified in the literature, as well as the associated impacts. It
6. See Jonathan D. Rockoff & Ed Silverman, Pharaceutical Companies Buy Rivals-
Drugs, Then Jack Up the Prices, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 26, 2015, 9:00 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/pharrmceutical-cormpanies-buy-rivals-drugs-then-jack-up-the-
prices-1430096431 (discussing the price increase in Daraprim); see also Steve Sternberg,
Senators Question Pricing of Generic Drugs, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:39 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/09/senators-question-pricing-of-generic-
drugs (discussing the price hikes inValeant-s drugs, Isuprel and Nitropress).
7. Jarmes Surowiecki, Taking on the Drug Profiteers, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 12,
2015, at 40, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/12/taking-on-the-
drug-profiteers.
8. See Nathan Bormey, Matin Shkreli Pleads the Fifth, Then Tweets About 'Imibeciles
in Congress, USA TODAY (Feb. 4, 2016, 6:30 PM), http://www.usatoday.comvstory/
rmoney/2016/02/04/martin-shkreli-congressional-testirmony-turing-pharrmceuticals-valeant-
fda-drug-prices/79808004/ (noting the Congressional hearing regarding the price hike in
Daraprimand the questions asked to Martin Shkreli, the CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals).
9. Jonathan Cohn, Donald Trump Reportedly Says He-s with Hillary Clinton, Bernie
Sanders on Drug Pricing, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2016, 1:28 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com'entry/trurmp-drug-prices-hi I lary-bernie_us_56a7ac37e4b01 72c65943f0b.
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utilizes the real-time drug pricing controversy involving Turing
Pharmaceuticals and Valeant Pharmaceuticals as examples of the impact on
cost associated with bio-pharma acquisitions. Next, the article explains the
FTC -s role in pre- merger assessments and the basic requirements on industry
imposed byfederal legislationand FTC policy. Thearticlethen offersreview
and analysis of over fifty FTC actions involving mergers and acquisitions in
the bio-pharmaceutical realrr drawing from three FTC publications. It
characterizes core requirements and conditions set forth in the consent orders,
and synthesi zes the legal landscape gleaned from the FTC publi cations. T he
article then discusses implications for the future.
I. BIO-PHARMA CONSOLIDATION: CAUSE AND EFFECT
Several driving factors are cited for consolidation trends in bio-pharma.
The first factor is healthcare reforM and specifically the evolving structure
of the healthcare market.10 The impact of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA)" can hardly be overstated. An emphasis on
value-based health care and payment systems underlies the ACA, with the
establishment of the Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI)
leading the charge on comparative effectiveness research to inform evidence-
based conversations about risks, benefits, and outcomes of different drug-
based interventions.12 Although healthcare reform and implementation of the
ACA are typically associated with trends in hospital and health insurance
consolidation generally, many commentators also point to them as factors in
bi o-pharmaceuti cal consolidation given the focus on costs and pricing across
the healthcare system including drug pricing.13
Second, commentators cite massive failures of previous business models
as driving mergers and acquisitions in the bi o-pharma sector. 14 The strategy
10. Rita E. Numerof et al., The Affordable Care Act-s Irmpact on Innovation in
Biopharrn, 38 PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. 24, 24 (2014), http://www.pharmtech.comf
affordable-care-acts- impact-innovati on-bi opharma-1.
11. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat 119
(2010).
12. The Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute is an independent non-profit
nongovernmental agency tasked with improving 'the quality and relevance of evidence
available to help patients, caregivers, clinicians, employers, insurers, and policy makers make
informed health decisions. Specifically, we fund comparative clinical effectiveness research,
or CE R, as well as support work that will improve the methods used to conduct such studies. -
About Us, PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RES. INST. (Oct. 6, 2014), http:/ANww.pcori.
org/about-us.
13. Numerof et al., supra note 10; Ian D. Spatz, Health Reform Accelerates Changes in
the Pharaceutical Industry, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1331,1331 (2010), http://content.healthaffairs.
org/content/29/7/1331.full.pdf+html.
14. :Trying to Recapture the Magic-: The Strategy Behind the Pharrm M&A
Rush, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 28, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edularticle/trying-recapture-magic-strategy-behind-pharrm-ma-rush/ [hereinafter
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of adj usti ng for these failures resenbl es a form of targeted risk aversion.
Large pharmaceutical companies, particularly multi-national companies,
have shifted focus to production and distribution, prioritizing mergers and
acquisitions over initial stage research and development efforts.1 s Many
companies have made the decision to outsource research and development to
smaller companies that they then acquire only after significant progress in
product development.16 In drug research and development terms, this means
shifting financial investments to phase II or III clinical investigations rather
than early discovery and phase I clinical investigations.17 Phase I
investigations involve the initial toxicity, pharmacodynamics and
pharmacokinetics of a drug compound. These investigations are often
unsuccessful, resulting in the abandonment of the drug for that specific
indication. Nature reports that approximately 85 percent of drug therapies
fail in the early clinical trial phases.18 Phase II and phase III investigations,
while continuing these measures, are focused largely on long-term safety and
efficacy, patient population, and adverse events. This shift may make
business sense given the high cost of getting a drug to market, cited at an
average of $1 billion and ten years of effort." However, it may also be
slowing down innovation. Forbes notes that, 'the major outcome for R&D
in mergers is that there will ultimately be fewer scientists in R&D and fewer
ideas being pursued. _20
The third factor is the difficulty in identifying promising new drugs that
have not already been developed, approved, and marketed. In other words,
all of the low-hanging fruits have been picked.21 Companies are struggling to
identify novel chemical, molecular, and biological entities with lucrative
profit potential that have not been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for one indication or another. Others counter that drug
development has never been easy, that in fact there has never been any low-
hanging fruit.22
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON].
15. Giuliana Miglierini, Mergers and Acquisitions for Big Pharrm, PHARMA
WORLD (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.pharmaworldmagazine.com/mergers-and-acquisitions-
for-big-pharma/.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Heidi Ledford, 4 Ways to Fix the Clinical Trial, 477 NATURE 526, 526(2011).
19. Id.
20. John LaMattina, Biopharaceutical Industry Consolidation Diminishes Future Drug
Discovery, FORBES (June 10, 2014, 8:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/
2014/06/10/biopharrmceutical-industry-consolidation-dini nishes-future-drug-discovery/.
21. Michael Williams, Productivity Shortifalls in Drug Discovery: Contributions fromthe
Preclinical Sciences? 336J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICs 3, 3 (2011);
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, supra note 14.
22. See, e.g., John LaMattina, There Has Never Really Been 'Low Hanging Fruit_ in
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The fourth factor is the expiration of patent protections for innovator drug
compounds and processes. Widespread expiration of successful blockbuster
drug patents, possibly the low-hanging fruit described above, can 'decimate_
a company s revenues.23 Of course, patent expirations have different impacts
on the innovator companies versus generic companies. On average, generic
competition results in about 90 percent revenue loss within the first two years
of patent expiration for the innovator product24 Coupled with these patent
expirations, the average development time from chenical identification to
market approval has doubled to ten to fifteen years since the 1970s, causing
a decrease in effective patent life.25 Relatedly, the fifth factor driving
consolidation is a desire to strengthen, broaden, or expand existing product
and patent portfolios in order to create new value for the company. 26 If
company patents are drying up, acquiring others- patents will generate new
revenue.
The sixth factor for consolidation in bio-pharma is ample tax opportunities
outside the United States for companies with a foreign address.27 One very
recent, and highly controversial, example was Pfizer-s proposed merger with
Allergan, which houses its global headquarters in Dublin, Ireland.28
Characterized as a tax inversion deal, Pfizer announced its $160 billion
merger with Allergan at the end of November 2015.29 T he merger would have
created the world s largest drug manufacturer and move the New Y ork-based
company s principle executive offices to Ireland where the tax rate is
Pharrm R&D, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlarmttina/
201 2/03/02/there-has-never-real ly-been-l ow-hanging-fruit-i n-pharma-rd/.
23. Patricia M. Danzon, et al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharaceutical and
Biotech Industries, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 307, 309(2007).
24. Steve Elms & MarkJones, M&A Market Reignites, TREASURER 40, 41 (May 2011),
http://www.treasurers.org/ACTm-edia/Mayl1TTciti40-42.pdf.
25. Dror Ben-Asher, In Need ofTreatrment? Merger Control, Pharaceutical Innovation,
and Consumer Welfare, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 276 (2000).
26. See Karlee Weinmann, Big Pharma Consolidation Underpins Deal Making in
2014, LAw360 (Apr. 8, 2014, 5:14 PM), https:/ANww.cov.com-/redia/files/corporate/
publications/2014/04/big-pharrm-consolidation-underpins-deal-making-in-2014.pdf (noting
the renewed emphasis on boosting value in pharma company collaborations).
27. KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, supra note 14.
28. Ransdell Pierson & Bill Berkrot, Pfizer to Buy Allergan in $160 Billion Deal,
REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-m-a-pfizer-
idUSK BNOTBOUT20151124.
29. Jim Puzzanghera & Samantha Masunaga, Pfizer and Allergan-s $160-Billion
Pharaceutical Merger Puts New Twist on Tax-Avoiding Inversions, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23,
2015, 9:35 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pfizer-allergan-rrerger-20151123-
story.html. Tax inversions are 'instances where firms that consist of multiple corporations
reorganize their structure so that the :parent- element of the group is a foreign corporation
rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G.
GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND
MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 5(2015).
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significantly reduced. 0 The Pfizer-Allergan conglomerate would have
boasted over 100 drugs in late- and mid-stage devel opment and would save
$2 billion by conbi ni ng operations over the first three years.3 1 H owever, as
a result of stricter government rules regarding corporate inversions
announced in April 2016, the two companies abandoned the deal.32
This is not an exhaustive list. The industry and academic literature reveals
myriad driving factors for consolidation. The literature also identifies
winners and losers, couched in terms of positive and negative impacts of
these consolidations on a variety of actors. These actors include the U.S.
market, competitors, consumers and patients, federal and state insurance
programs, researchers and scientists, and company employees. Regularly
cited as tangible negative impacts are large-scalejob losses,33 outsourcing of
manufacturing to other countries,3 decline in research and development,3 s
shifts in resource allocation away from early-stage investigations,3 6
elimination of certain types of product development, general stalling of
innovation,37 drug shortages resulting from removal of products from the
30. Puzzanghera & Masunaga, supra note 29.
31. Melissa Lipman, Antitrust Concerns Won't Derail $160B Pfizer-Allergan Deal,
LAw360 (Nov. 23, 2015, 8:43 PM), http://www.Iaw360.comarticles/730724/antitrust-
concerns-won-t-derail-160b-pfizer-allergan-deal.
32. Caroline Hurmer & Ankur Banerjee, Pfizer, Allergan Scrap $160 Billion Deal After
U.S. Tax Rule Change, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2016, 7:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
allergan-m-a-pfizer-idUSKCNOX3188.
33. Sy Mukherjee, 3 Major Trends Driving Layoffs in Biotech and Pharrm,
BIOPHARMADIV E (May 27, 2015) http://www.biopharrmdive.cominews/3-rmjor-trends-
driving-layoffs-in-biotech-and-pharrm/399484/.
34. Global Contract Manufacturing Companies: Pharaceutical and Biotechnology,
PHARMALIVE (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.pharmal ive.com'global-contract-manufacturi ng-
companies-pharmaceutical-and-biotechnology/ ('Moving forward, pharma companies are
expected to outsource growing amounts of manufacturing as companies concentrate on R& D
and marketing activities.).
35. Robert Thong, Root Causes of the Pharaceutical R&D Productivity Crisis,
SciTECHSTRATEGY (Mar. 31, 2015), http://scitechstrategy.com/201 5/03/root-causes-of-the-
pharrmceutical-rd-productivity-crisis/ (noting that 'consolidation in the pharmaceutical
industry and the concomitant scaling up and industrialization of its R&D infrastructure had
created diseconomies of scale, severely reducing the innovative culture of the R&D
organizations and the creative risk-taking of their scientists.).
36. Chris Lo, Pharrm Mergers: Big Business, Bad Science?, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH.
(J an. 7, 2015), http://www.pharmaceutical-technology.comfeatures/featurepharrm-mergers-
big-busi ness-bad-science-4467897/ (explaining that consolidation among pharmaceutical
companies can lead to the termination of research and development activity that doesnt fit
with the larger company-s broader goals or early-stage research that is deemed too risky to
continue).
37. Id. (arguing that consolidation hinders innovation because it has led to a cost-saving,
research-cutting pattern resulting in the elimination of research sites, programs, and scientists.
Also, the article argues that consolidation decreases healthy competition, which fuels
innovation).
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market, 8 and higher prices for consumers through price increases. 9
Perhaps the timeliest of these cited negative impacts is that of inflated drug
pricing. Media outlets such as the New York Times, the Wall Street] ournal,
and the Huffington Post have relentlessly targeted a number of bio-pharma
companies for pricing activity in late 2015.40 While the FDA is responsible
for review and approval of new drugs and bi ol ogi cs, the agency does not have
a role in the eventual price of the commercial products once on the market.41
Likewise, the Department of Health and Human Services assesses coverage
for federal reimbursement purposes, though the agency has no control over
the prices themselves.42 And the FTC and the Department of justice (DOJ)
are tasked with policing anti competitive behavior through review of mergers
and acquisitions, yet neither agency specifically examines current pricing
regimes as part of the legal analysis of pending consolidations.43 The next
section examines the FT C s role in consolidation assessments.
The contemporary touchstone of bad industry behavior in this realm is
uncontrovertibly Turing Pharmaceutical s (now former) CEO, Martin
Shkreli. Following the August 2015 acquisition of the five decades-old
38. Rob Stein, Shortages of Key Drugs Endanger Patients, WASH. POST (May 1, 2011),
https://www.washi ngtonpost.cominational/shortages-of-key-drugs-endanger-
patients/2011/04/26/AFlaJJV F_story.html?hpid=z5 ('Consolidation in the pharmaceutical
industry has left only a few manufacturers for many older, less profitable products, meaning
that when raw material runs short, equipment breaks down or government regulators crack
down, the snags can quickly spiral into shortages.j.
39. Aimee Picchi, 5 Reasons Generic Drugs Cost So Much, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 20, 2015 5:41AM), http://www. cbsnews.com/news/5-reasons-why-generi c-drugs-cost-
so-much/ ('Consumers end up paying more because consolidation means less competition
among generic drug makers, allowing prices to rise.).
40. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-
in-a-drugs-pri ce-rai ses-protests.htnl; Jonathan D. Rockoff, Valeant Probe Reprises
Federal Focus on Drug Pricing, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 15, 2015, 7:35 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articleslvaleant-probe-repri ses-federal-focus-on-drug-pri ci ng-
1444952138; Anna Almendrala, What The Daraprim Price Hike Actually Does To Health Cara
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept 23, 2015, 10:38AM), http://www.huffingtonpostcomentry/daraprim-
price-turing-shkreli_us_560063cee4b0
031 0edf82060.
41. How Drugs are Developed and Approved, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 18,
2015), http:/ANww.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDeveloped
andA pproved/.
42. Amy Goldstein, Sharp Increases in Drug Costs Draw Hundreds to Government
Forum WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/
wp/201 5/11/20/sharp-increases-i n-drug-costs-draw-hundreds-to-government-forum/ (' H HS
has written to pharmaceutical companies, asking them to provide more information about their
pricing and ideas on how to encourage prices that promote access. _.
43. FED. TRADE COMM N & U.S. DEP-T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 2 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
fil es/documents/publicevents/joint-venture-heari ngs-antitrust-guidel i nes-col I aboration-
among-com-peti tors/ftcdojguidel i nes-2. pdf.
40 Vol. 25
A Profile of Bio-pharma Consolidation Activity
prescription drug DaraprimfromImpax Laboratories,4 Shkreli ratcheted up
the price of Darapri m from $13.50 to $750.00 per pill . 5 T he media coverage,
public backlash, and state legal actions were swift The New York Attorney
General s Office began an investigation under state antitrust laws in
October.46 On December 17, 2015, Shkreli and his corporate attorney were
both arrested in Manhattan on charges of securities fraud and conspiracy
perpetrated during Shkreli s tenure at Retrophin.47 Shkreli resigned from
Turing the following day48 and was fired as CEO of another company,
KaloBios Pharmaceuticals, a few days later.49
Similarly, V al eant Pharmaceuticals has been subj ect to intense scrutiny for
its hefty price increase for the two heart drugs Isuprel (isoproterenol
hydrochloride) and Nitropress (nitroprusside sodium), acquired mid-2015
from Salix Pharmaceuticals.s0 List prices for the drugs rose steeply 212
percent and 525 percent.1 The price for a third drug acquired from Sal ix, the
type 2 diabetes drug Glumetza (metformin hydrochloride), rose 800
percent.52 In October, the U.S. Attorneys-Offices subpoenaed the company
for the District of Massachusetts and the Southern District of New Y ork.s3
44. Turing Pharaceuticals AG Acquires U.S. Marketing Right to DARAPRIM+
(pyrimethanine), PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 10, 2015, 6:35 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com-
news- rel eases/turi ng-pharmaceuti cal s-ag-acquires-us-marketing-ri ghts-to-darapri m-
pyrirmethani ne-300125853.html.
45. Pollack, supra note40.
46. Andrew Pollack, New York Attorney General Examining Whether Turing Restricted
Drug Access, N.Y . TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com2015/10/13/business/new-
york-attorney-general-exam ni ng-if-turing-restricted-drug-access.htni?action=cl ick& content
Collection=Business%20Day&rmodule=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=artic
le.
47. Julie Creswell et al., Drug C.E.O. Martin Shkreli Arrested on Fraud
Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.nytim-es.com2015/12/18/business/shkreli-
fraud-charges. htnl?hp& action=cl ick& pgtype= H omepage& cli ckSource=story-
heading& rmodule=second-colunn-region& region=top-news& WT.nav=top-news&_r-0.
Charmingly, one journalist calls this 'pharma karma._ see Ashby Jones & Sara Randazzo,
Lawyer Linked to Martin Shkreli Arrested on Fraud Charge (Dec. 17, 2015, 8:08 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawyer-linked-to-rmrtin-shkreli-arrested-on-fraud-charge-
1450393836.
48. Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli Resigns fromTuring Pharaceuticals, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/business/martin-shkreli-resigns-turing-
drug-comrpany.html?_r-0.
49. Everett Rosenfeld, MartinShkreli Fired asCEO of KaloBios Pharaceuticals, CNBC
(Dec. 21, 2015, 11:04 AM), http://www.cnbc.com2015/12/21/rmrtin-shkreli-fired-as-ceo-of-
kalobios-pharmaceuticals.html.
50. Rockoff & Silverman, supra note 6; see also Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise,
Valeant-s Drug Price Strategy Enriches It, But Infuriates Patient and Lawakers, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/valeants-drug-price-
strategy-enriches-it-but-infuriates-patients-and-lawmakers.html.
51. Rockoff & Silverman, supra note 6.
52. Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 50.
53. Ransdell Pierson & Bill Berkrot, Valeant Subpoenaed by U.S. Prosecutors; Shares
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Congress and politicians have also responded to the pricing controversy
inspired by Valeant, Turing, and others. The Senate Special Committee on
Aging initiated an investigation of four companies: Retrophin, Rodelis
Therapeutics, Turing Pharmaceuticals, and Valeant Pharmaceuticals.'
Likewise, the House Oversight and Government Reform Comnittee is
investigating several companies" and House Democrats have created a new
investigative task force and plan on summoning executives at Turing and
V aleant for a Congressional hearing.5 6 On December 16, 2015, Delaware
Representative Elijah Cummings sent a letter to the CEO of Valeant
Pharmaceuticals threatening a subpoena if he failed to provide the House
Committee with requested documents and interviews from witnesses prior to
January 8th in preparation for a committee meeting on drug pricing."
Presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders have made drug
pricing and 'pharma profiteers_" a campaign issue. 9
II. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
The FTC is responsible for protecting the public from anticompetitive
behavi or and deceptive and unfair trade practices. I Along with the DOJ, the
FTC prosecutes violations of the Clayton Act.6 1 The Health Care Division
within the FTC-s Bureau of Competition investigates alleged antitrust
Drop, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2015, 7:20 PM), http:/ANww.reuters.comarticle/us-valeant-pharrms-
subpoena-idUSKCNOS90XO20151015; Jonathan D. Rockoff, Valeant Pharaceuticals
Under Investigation by Federal Prosecutors, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2015, 12:11 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/valeant-pharmaceuti cals-under-i nvestigati on-by-federal-
prosecutors-1444874710; Rockoff, supra note40.
54. Anna Edney & Melissa Mittelman, Valeant Turing Would Face Subpoena Vote
Under Democrats Plan, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2015, 3:44 PM), http://www.bloom-berg.com
news/arti cl es/201 5-11 -04/valeant-turi ng-would-face-subpoena-vote-under-democrats-plan.
55. Mary Ellen McIntire, Cumnings Threatens Valeant with Subpoena in House Drug
Prices Investigation, MORNING CONSULT (Dec. 16, 2015), http://rrorningconsult.conv2015/
1 2/cummi ngs-threatens-val eant-wi th-subpoena-i n-house-drug-prices-i nvestigati on/.
56. Edney & Mittelman, supra note 54.
57. McIntire, supra note 55.
58. Factsheets: Hillary Clinton-s Plan for Lowering Prescription Drug Costs, 2016
HILLARY FOR AMERICA, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2015/09/21/
hillary-clinton-plan-for-lowering-prescription-drug-costs/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016); Peter
Loftus, Bernie Sanders to Introduce Bill Targeting High Drug Prices, WALL STREETJ. (Sept.
9, 2015 7:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bernie-sanders-to-introduce-bill-targeting-
high-drug-prices-1441839693.
59. Dan Merica, Clinton Takes on :Profiteering- Drug Companies, CNN
(Sept. 22, 2015, 8:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/22/politics/hillary-clinton-drug-
companies-obamacare/ L oftus, supra note 58.
60. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Mar.
25, 2016).
61. ClaytonAct 15 U.S.C. 1 12-27(2013).
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violations in the health care real M including pharmaceutical matters.62 An
important aspect of the work of the Health Care Division is overseeing
mergers and acquisitions.63
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 19766 establishes
a federal system of premerger notification in order to prevent anti competitive
mergers and acquisitions.65 A ny deal valued at $76.3 million 66 or more must
be reported for review both to the FTC and the DOJ.67 Parties must complete
a 'Notification and Report Form for Certain Mergers and Acquisitions
detailing information about each business involved in the transaction.6
There is then a waiting period, typically thirty days, during which the parties
may not move on the deal unless the government grants an early termination
of the waiting period.I
Upon review, the FTC may challenge any merger that in its view will
'result in a substantial lessening of competition._70 An FTC challenge to a
particular transaction is conducted in an administrative adjudication before
an administrative law judge (A L] ).71 Appeals from the initial A L] decision
may be brought to the full Commission; appeals from the full Commission
decision may be brought in federal courts of appeal.72 T he FT C may also seek
a preliminary or permanent injunction in federal district court.73
The FTC has targeted some hospital and healthcare mergers and
62. FED. TRADE COMM N, HEALTH CARE Div., OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 1 (2013), https:/ANww.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/comrpetition-policy-guidance/rxupdate.pdf [hereinafter FTC ANTITRUST
ACTIONS].
63. Id. at 26.
64. 15 U.S.C. 1 8a (2015).
65. Prerrerger Notification Progranr FED. TRADE COMM-N, https://www.ftc.gov
/enforcerment/premerger-notification-program (last visited Mar. 25, 2016); see also Merger
Review, FED. TRADE COMM N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-
and-competition/merger-review (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
66. HSR Threshold Adjustments and Reportability - 2015 Edition, FED. TRADE
COMM-N (Jan. 23, 2015, 12:12 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/comipetition-
matters/2015/01/hsr-threshold-adjustments-reportability-2015-edition ($76.3 million is the
adjusted threshold amount for 2015).
67. Id.
68. FED. TRADE COMM-N, GUIDE I: WHAT IS THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM?:
AN OVERVIEW 6 (Mar. 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachrments/premerger-
introductory-guides/gui del. pdf.
69. See id. at 9.
70. Carla A.R. Hine, FTC Merger Review Likely to Incorporate Analysis of Privacy
Issues, NAT-L L. REV. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ftc-merger-
review-likely-to-incorporate-analysis-privacy-issues.
71. 15 U.S.C. f 45(b) (2006).
72. 15 U.S.C. f 45(c) (2006).
73. Id.
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acquisitions citing the need for healthy competition in those industries.74
Despite pleas from some outlets that healthcare markets are different and that
strategically unified health and medical services are optimal, the FTC
maintains that the antitrust laws nonetheless apply with equal force .7 The
FTC highlights:
[W]hen a merger or other form of collaboration may allow providers to
demand higher fees through increased bargaining leverage, the antitrust
laws are the appropriate mechanism for determining whether consolidation
or collaboration, on balance, is more likely to result in higher costs without
corresponding improvements in quality of care. And the risk of harm
increases when integration or coordination involves a substantial portion
of the competing providers in any particular service or specialty.76
The FTC has specifically challenged a number of bio-pharma mergers and
acquisitions identified in pre-merger notifications submitted to the agency.
In a recent annual report, the FTC notes that 6.1 percent of the transactions
setforth in pre-mergerfilings are in the chemical and pharmaceutical realm.78
For example, the FTC position regarding the proposed 2008 acquisition of
Taro Pharmaceutical Industries by Sun Pharmaceutical Industries was that
the transaction 'would be anti competitive and would cause U.S. consumers
to pay higher prices for three distinct generic formulations of the
anticonvulsant drug carbamazepine_ because '[b]oth companies either
manufacture the relevant generic drug products and sell them in the United
States, or are set to enterthe U.S. market with competing products in the near
future, pending regulatory approval. _"7 In order to proceed with the
acquisition, the FTC required Sun to enter into a consent order to sell all
rights and assets to the three anticonvulsant drugs to an India-based generic
drug manufacturer.80
74. See, e.g., Marina Lao et al., Not Just an Opinion: Competition Really is Key to
Healthy Health Care Markets, FED. TRADE COMM-N (July 8, 2015, 9:54 AM), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/07/not-just-opinion-comrpetition-
real ly-key-healthy-health.
75. See Robert Pear, F.T.C. Wary of Mergers by Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com2014/09/18/business/ftc-wary-of-mergers-by-hospitals-.htni?_r=2.
76. Lao et al., supra note 74.
77. See generally EDITH RAMIREZ & WILLIAM J. BAER, FED. TRADE COMM N & DEP-T OF
J USTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINo ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2013), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/fi les/docum-ents/reportsB36th- report-
fy2013/140521 hsrreport.pdf.
78. Id.at7.
79. FTC Challenges Sun Pharrmceuticals Purchase of Taro Pharraceutical Industries,
FED. TRADE COMM N (Aug. 13, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/
08/ftc-chal I enges-sun- pharmaceuti cal s-purchase-taro- pharrmaceuti cal.
80. Id.
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The following section analyzes FTC assessments and consent orders
resulting from premerger notification review in order to further characterize
their substance and scope.
III. FTC ENFORCEMENTS ACTIVITY: A MODEST SAMPLE
This section draws from three reports published by the FTC. The first is a
March 2013 report by the FTC Health Care Division that provides an
overview of select antitrust actions in pharmaceutical services and products
spanning 1989 through early 2013.81 The second and third are joint FTC
Bureau of Competition and DOJ Antitrust Division Hart-Scott-Rodino
annual reports for fiscal year 2013 and 2014 that identify merger enforcement
activity resulting from premerger notifications.82 In total, these three reports
detail fifty-four relevant bio-pharma mergers and acquisitions scrutinized by
the FTC from FY 1989-2014. Table 1 provides a listing of these fifty-four
enforcement actions initiated by the FT C as described in these three reports.
The format of the references correspond directly to the reference provided in
each report.
TABLE 1: FTC REPORTS ENFORCEMENT ACTION TALLIES
(ALPHABETICAL ORDER)
FTC Bureau of Competition, Health Care Division, Overview of FTC Antitrust
Actions in Pharmaceutical Services and Products, March 2013 (45 Total)
A ctavi s/A bri ka"
Allergan/Inamed"
Armerican Home Products/American Cyanamid"
A mrgen/Immunex8 6
81. FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS, supra note 62.
82. RAMIREZ & BAER supra note 77; EDITH RAMIREZ & WILLIAM J. BAER, FED. TRADE
COMM-N & DEPT OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINo ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
2014 (2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/systemfi les/docum-ents/reports/federal-trade-
commission- bureau-competiti on-department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-
rodino.s.c.1 8a-hart-scott-rodi no-antitrust-i mrprovements-act-1976/15081 3hsr report.pdf.
83. Actavis Grp. hf., F.T.C. No. 0710063 (May 18, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/05/070522do0710063.pdf.
84. Allergan, Inc., F.T.C. No. 0610031 (Apr. 17, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/fi Ies/documents/cases/2006/04/061 0031 all ergani nameddecisi onandorderpubl icrecord
version. pdf.
85. Am Home Prods. Corp., 119 F.T.C. 217(1995).
86. Armgen Inc., et al. 134 F.T.C. 333 (2002).
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Barr/Pliva 7
Baxter-Immuno International"
Baxter/Wyeth89
Cephalon/Cima Labs"
Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz91
Dow Chemical/Rugby Darby Group92
Fresenius Medical Care/Daiichi Sankom
Genzyme/Ilex Oncology"
Glaxo/Burroughs Wellcome 5 6
Glaxo Wellcome/SmithK line Beecham96
Grifolis/Talecris7
Hi kma/Baxter"
H oechst/D ow"
H oechst/R hone-Poul encioo
Hospira/Mayne 01
IVAX/Zenith 02
J ohnson & J ohnson/Pfizeros
K i ng/A I pharmal1
87. Barr Pharm, Inc., F.T.C. No. 0610217 (Nov. 22, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/12/0610217barrdofinal.pdf.
88. Baxter Intl, Inc., 123 F.T.C. 904(1997).
89. Baxter Intl Inc., et al., 135 F.T.C. 49 (2003).
90. Cephalon, Inc., 138 F.T.C. 583 (2004).
91. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., et al., 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997).
92. Dow Chem Co., etal., 118 F.T.C. 730(1994).
93. Fresenius Med. Care AG & Co. KGaA, F.T.C. No. 0810146 (Oct. 20, 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/10/081021freseniusdo.pdf.
94. Genzyme Corp., et al, 139 F.T.C. 49 (2005).
95. Glaxo PLC, 119 F.T.C. 815(1995).
96. GIaxo WeIcorme PLC, et al., 131 F.T.C. 56 (2001).
97. Grifols, S.A., F.T.C. No. 1010153 (July 20, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
fi I es/documrents/cases/2011/07/110722grifolsdo.pdf.
98. Hikma Pharm PLC, F.T.C. No. 1110051 ( une 6, 2011), https:/ANww.ftc.gov/sitest
default/fi Ies/documents/cases/2011/06/11 0607hi kmabaxterdo. pdf.
99. Hoechst AG, 120 F.T.C. 1010 (1995).
100. HoechstAG, F.T.C. No. 9910071 (Dec. 7, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/docum-ents/cases/1999/12/hoechst.do_.htm.
101. Hospira, Inc., F.T.C. No. 07100020 an. 18, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documrents/cases/2007/01/070118do0710002.pdf.
102. IVAX Corp., 119 F.T.C. 357 (1995).
103. Johnson & J ohnson, F.T.C. No. 0610220 a an. 16, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sitest
default/files/documents/cases/2007/01/0610220c4180
decisionorderpublicversion.pdf.
104. King Pharm., Inc., F.T.C. No. 0810240 (Feb. 2, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2009/02/090203alpharmado.pdf.
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Mylan/Merck01s
Novartis/Alcon 06
Novartis/E ON 10 7
Novartis/Fougera Holdings"
Perri go/Paddock"o
Pfizer/Pharmacia110
Pfizer/Warner-Lambert11
Pfizer/Wyeth 12
Roche Holding AG/Corange Limited1
Sanofi-Synthelabo/Aventis Pharmal 4
Schering-Plough/Merck & Co.s
Schering-Plough/Organon International116
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries L td.T aro Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.117
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries/Barr Pharmaceuticals"
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries/Cephalon, Inc.119
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries/IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Inc.120
The Upjohn Company/Pharmacia1 2 1
105. Mylan Lab. Inc., F.T.C. No. 0710164 (Nov. 1, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2007/11/071106do0710164.pdf.
106. Novartis AG, F.T.C. No. 1010068 (Sept. 28, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2010/10/101001novartisdo_0.pdf.
107. NovartisAG, 140 F.T.C. 480 (2005).
108. Novartis AG, F.T.C. No. 1210144 (Sept. 4, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2012/09/120904novartisdo.pdf.
109. Perrigo Co., F.T.C. No. 1110083 (June 21, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2012/06/110626perrigodo.pdf.
110. Pfizer Inc., 135 F.T.C. 608 (2003).
111. Pfizer Inc., F.T.C. No. 0010059 (July 27, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sitest
default/files/documents/cases/2000/07/pfizervvarnerlam-bertdo.htm.
112. Pfizer Inc., F.T.C. No. 0910053 (Jan. 25, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2010/01/100129pwyethdo.pdf.
113. Roche Holding Ltd., 125 F.T.C. 919 (1998).
114. Sanofi-Synthelabo, etal., 138 F.T.C. 478(2004).
115. Schering-Plough Corp., F.T.C. No. 0910075 (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/10/091029meorckscheringdo.pdf.
116. Schering-Plough Corp., F.T.C. No. 0710132 (Dec. 28, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080104do_1.pdf.
117. Sun Pharm. Indus. Ltd., F.T.C. No. 0710193 (Sept. 16, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080919sunpharmdo.pdf.
118. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd., F.T.C. No. 0810224 (Feb. 9, 2009), https://www.ftc.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/02/09021Otevabarrdo.pdf.
119. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd., F.T.C. No. 1110166 a uly 2, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/07/120703tevacephalondo.pdf.
120. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd., F.T.C. No. 0510214 (Mar. 2, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/03/0510214do060307.pdf.
121. Upjohn Co., 121 F.T.C. 44 (1996).
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V aleant Pharmaceuticals/Dernik1 2 2
V al eant P harmaceuti cal s/0 rtho D ermathol ogi cs, Inc. 123
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc./Actavisl24
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc./Andrx Corporation1 25
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc./Arrow Pharmaceutical S126
Zeneca Group PLC/Astra1 2 7
FTC Bureau of Competition and DOJ Antitrust Division, Hart-Scott-Rodino
Annual Report Fiscal Year 2013 (2 Total)
ActavisNWarner Chilcottl 28
Mylan/Agila Specialties1 2 9
FTC Bureau of Competition and DOJ Antitrust Division, Hart-Scott-Rodino
Annual Report Fiscal Year 2014 (6 Total)
A korn, Inc./H i-Tech Pharmaceuticals 13o
A korn, Inc.N ersaPharnM Inc.131
Endo International, PLC/Boca Life Science Holdings, L LC 13 2
122. Valeant Pharm Intl Inc., F.T.C. No. 1110215 (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/02/120222valeantsanofido.pdf.
123. Valeant Pharm Intl Inc., F.T.C. No. 1110216 (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/02/120222valeantdo.pdf.
124. Watson Pharm Inc et al., F.T.C. No. 1210132, at 2-52 (Dec. 13, 2012)
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/12/121214watsonactavisdo.pdf
(since this was also contained in one of the other reports, it is not listed in the Table 1 tallies.).
125. Watson Pharm. Inc., F.T.C. No. 0610139, at 2-44 (Dec. 6, 2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/12/061212do-publicverO6101
39.pdf [hereinafter Watson Pharm].
126. Watson Pharm, Inc., F.T.C. No. 0910116, at 2-28 (Jan. 7, 2010) https://www.ftc.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/01/100115watsondo.pdf.
127. Zeneca Grp. PLC, 127 F.T.C. 874, at 3-8 (Jun. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Zeneca Grp.
PLC].
128. Actavis, Inc., F.T.C. No. 1310152, at 2-39 (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/fi I es/documents/cases/1 31 0152_c4414_actavis_warnerdecisionand order p
ublicversion.pdf.
129. Mylan Inc. et al., F.T.C. No. 1310112, at 3-44 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docum-ents/cases/131218mylando.pdf.
130. Akorn, Inc & Hi-Tech Pharm Co., Inc., F.T.C. No. 1310221, at2-37(June2O, 2014),
https:/Awww.ftc.gov/system/files/docum-ents/cases/140620akorndo.pdf [hereinafter Akorn
Inc.].
131. Akorn, Inc., F.T.C. No. 1410162, at 1-4 (Sept. 19, 2014) (this is an
agreement containing consent orders.) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docum-ents/cases/
1409akorndo.pdf
132. Endo Health Solutions, Inc et al., F.T.C. No. 1310225, at 2-41(Mar. 19, 2014),
https:/Awww.ftc.gov/system/files/docum-ents/cases/140321endobocado.pdf.
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Forest Laboratories/Actavis133
Prestige B rands/Insight Pharmaceuticals, L L C. 134
V aleant Pharmaceuticals International/Precision Dermatology13 s
These three reports were consulted and analyzed in order to address the
following general inquiry: what limitations has the FTC imposed on mergers
and acquisitions in the bio-pharma realm through pre-merger enforcement
actions? The methodology entailed identification of bio-pharma companies
in each of the three reports for inclusion in the assessment Medical device
companies, health insurance companies, and hospitals were excluded from
assessments as outside the realm of the bio-pharma sector. Also excluded
were enforcement actions that were ultimately dismissed or enforcement
actions where the parties cancelled the planned transaction. Each relevant
description involving a bio-pharma company was then reviewed and
characterized in terms of consent order requirements, as set forth by the FTC
report. Report descriptions included both FTC adjudications resulting in
consent order and litigation resulting in consent order. The end of each
description within the reports identified the core consent order requirements.
Thereareseveral limitations to this methodological approach. Thefirstis
reliance on the FT C report summati ons of the consent order rather than on
analysis of the consent orders themselves. The second is incomplete
information on a number of fronts, including a lack of: detailed
characteristics of each transaction, the number and extent of drug products
involved, concessions made by the company during the course of
adjudication, and follow-up information on how the companies fulfilled the
consent order requi rements. T he third is that the reports provide no indication
of why the FTC flagged these particular transactions as problematic, and
relatedly, why other transactions were not flagged for enforcement action.
General features mentioned within the report descri pti ons do provide some
guidance on why the deals were flagged by the FTC. These noted features
included the monetary size of the deal, the relationship between the
companies and their competitive positions, the markets involved (e.g.,
generic, brand, or specialty drug markets), and the potential impact on the
availability of particular drug products resulting from the transaction. Despite
these limitations, the methodology does provide a useful glimpse at the
defining characteristics of FTC requirements for bio-pharma mergers and
133. Actavis PLC, F.T.C. No. 1410098, at 2-42 (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/140905actavisdo.pdf.
134. Prestige Brands Holdings, Inc., F.T.C. No. 1410159, at 2-28 (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docum-ents/cases/141014prestigebrandsdo.pdf.
135. Valeant Pharm. Intl, Inc., F.T.C. No.1410101, at 2-32 (Aug. 20, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcem-ent/cases-proceedings/141-0101/valeant-pharmaceuticals-
international-precision-dermatology.
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acquisitions, as set forth in the consent orders.
The findings are discussed below, divided into eleven categories of
requirements and conditions: divestiture; trustee/monitor appointment; prior
approval of certain activity; relinquishment/terni nation; return; transfer;
supply arrangements; intellectual property; confidentiality; competition
restrictions; and miscellaneous. Table 2 lists these categorizations. Each is
expanded on below. Truncated references identify the parties to the
transaction and correspond to Table 1 full references.
TA BL E 2 CONSENT ORDER CA TEGORIZA TIONS
Divestiture
T rustee/M onitor A ppoi ntment
PriorApproval of Certain Activity
R eli nqui shment/T ermi nation
Return
Transfer
Supply Arrangements
Intellectual Property
Confidentiality
Competition Restrictions
Miscellaneous
A. Divestiture
One resounding finding is that in most of the fifty-four consent orders, the
FTC required divestiture of some measure, subject to much variation. The
consent orders uniformly required divestiture of certain rights and assets,
typically identifying particular products to be divested. The consent orders
often specified to whom the divestiture was to be made, by what deadline,
and conditioned the final deal on the approval of the FTC. Many contained a
provision specifying that if the FTC determined that the named companies
for divestiture purchase were not acceptable buyers, the company must
abandon the deals and find FTC-approved buyers within a set time frame.
One FTC description of the consent order termed this 'unwind[ing] the
divestiture._ 13 There was also the inclusion of a provision in one consent
136. See, e.g., Watson Pharm., supra note 125, at 27 (specifying the time frame at six
months).
137. FTC Intervenes in King Pharrmceuticals Acquisition of Rival Alpharrn Inc., FED.
TRADE COMM N (Dec. 29, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/12/
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order that 'would have required a larger asset divestiture had the more
narrowly tailored divestiture not occurred. 138
The consent orders included requirements for the divestiture of specific
product business; 13 divestiture of worldwide rights to a specific productl40
divestiture of trademark rights to specific products;141 divestiture of
contractual rights to a drug, either to the named divestiture buyer or a third
party approved by FTC; 142 and divestiture of a brand. 143 One case expressly
identified the scope of the assets in that case as including 'patents, ...
technology, ... manufacturing information, testing and quality control data,
research materials,... customer lists... [and] inventory sufficient ... to
complete all clinical trials or ... studies necessary to obtain FDA
approval. 144 Another required the divestiture of development and
distribution rights, including ongoing clinical trials for a particular product. 145
Several required divestiture of certain U.S. patents and other assets in areas
where the divestiture buyer markets the drug. 14 6 Others required the
divestiture of assets and termination of interests. 147 Many consent orders
required that the divesting party maintain the drug-s viability, marketability,
and competitiveness pending divestiture.14
B. Trustee/Monitor Appointment
A number of consent orders required the appointment of a third party to
assess and assure compliance with the terms of the order. The provisions
ranged from a general right of the FTC to appoint an interim monitor to
ensure parties fulfill their obligations at any time 49 to in-depth specifications
on what that monitor is to accomplish. One consent order set forth the right
ftc-intervenes-king-pharmaceuticals-acquisition-rival-alpharma; see also King Pharm., Inc.,
supra note 104, at 19-22.
138. FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS, supra note 62, at 52 (referring to this as the 'crown
jewel _.
139. See generally Analysis Of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment,
FED. TRADE COMM N, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2003/D4/pfizer
analysis.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) (The 'Cortaid business_ and 'Hall cough drop
business_ are examples of specific product businesses).
140. See GlaxoWellcome PLC, et al., supra note 96, at 56.
141. Id.
142. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, et al., supra note 114, at478.
143. See generally Pfizer Inc., et al., supra note 110, at 608.
144. See Glaxo PL C, supra note 95, at 819.
145. See Allergan, Inc., supra note 84, at 5, 12.
146. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo, et al., supra note 114, at 487.
147. See, e.g., Baxter Intl Inc., et al., supra note 8889, at49; see also, Zeneca Grp. PLC,
supra note 127, at 874 (requiring the 'transfer and surrender_ of rights and assets).
148. See Akorn Inc., supra note 130, at 27; see also, Actavis, Inc., supra note 128, at 31.
149. See Schering-Plough Corp., supra note 115, at 33; see also Akorn Inc., supra note
130, at 29.
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of the FT C to appoint a trustee after a failure to comply as a means to assure
that assets are returned as required. 1s0 Another included an express provision
for the appointment of an interim trustee to ensure that the devel opment of a
particular product is maintained in the future.11 Perhaps most detailed, one
consent order provided for the appointment of an interim monitor to ensure
that information is adequately communicated to the FDA, that the company
acquiring the divested product line gets assistance with a pending abbreviated
new drug application ('A NDA _, and that transitional services are provided
so the third party can eventually manufacture the product independently. 15 2
These last two monitor duties relate to supply arrangements, which are
further discussed below.
C. Prior Approval of Certain Activity
The prior approval provisions were tied to the acquisition of property or
assets in the future. One iteration required the prior approval of the FTC
before the acquisition of any stock in a company that manufactures or is an
exclusive distributor for another manufacturer of a specific product" A
second required prior approval from the FTC before acquisition of any
manufacturing, production, or distribution capabilities for a specific
product.1" A third prohibited the acquisition of certain listed assets without
the prior approval of the FTC. 1
D. Relinquishmrent/Ternination
There were several consent orders requiring the relinquishment of assets,
including provisions requiring the relinquishment of marketing rights to
another firm56 and the relinquishment of 'all options to regain control over_
a certain product.' Termination requirements took many forms, such as the
termination of an existing development and manufacturing agreement with a
third party and transfer of manufacturing rights back to a third party,158
termination of a co-marketing agreement with a third party,159 ternination of
150. See generally, Novartis A G, supra note 106, at 29-32.
151. See Pfizer Inc., supra note 143112, at 55.
152. See A korn Inc., supra note 130, at 2-37.
153. See IV AX Corp., supra note 102, at 362 (specifying that prior approval is needed for
ten years following the date the order becomes final).
154. See Dow Chemical Co., et al., supra note 92, at 742 (specifying that prior approval
is needed for ten years following the date the order becomes final).
155. See Schering-Plough Co., supra note 116,115 at 23-24 (specifying that prior
approval is needed for ten years following the date the order becomes final).
156. See generally Watson Pharm., supra note 125, at 2-44.
157. See Glaxo Wellcome PLC, et al., supra note 96, at 56.
158. See generally Watson Pharm. Inc., et al. supra note 125.
159. See Baxter Intl Inc., et al., supra note 88, at 49.
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all confidential information regarding a certain product1 " and full1 6 1 or
partial assignment of manufacturing contracts. 162
E. Return
T here were also several forms of requirement to return assets or property.
These included the requirement of the return of exclusive distribution
rights; 163 the requirement to end a marketing agreement with a third party and
return all rights to distribute, market and sell certain products;" and the
return of all rightstoa specific drug in clinical developmenttoathird party.16s
F. Transfer
Transfer requirements dealt with conditions such as the transfer of supply
agreement to the divestiture buyer,166 the transfer of manufacturing facilities
to the divestiture buyer, 167 and the transfer of all technical knowledge for
certain product to the divestiture buyer.168
G. Supply Arrangements
Provisions for supply arrangement were perhaps the most far-ranging and
specific to drug products and devel opment status. This makes sense, as the
FTC focus on the impact on drug markets relates to supply and demand of
these products in the marketplace. One consent decree required the entry into
a supply agreement to provcide the third party with generic tablets, allowing
the third party to compete with the generic product during the 180-day
exclusivity; the supply agreement could be extended one additional year by
the third party.169 Another required the party divesting to provide transitional
160. See Pfizer Inc., supra note 165, at 8-9.
161. See Akorn, Inc., supra note 130, at 2-3716, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/140620akorndo.pdf.
162. See V aleant Pharm. Intl, Inc., F.T.C. No. 1410101 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documrents/cases/140820valeantprecisiondo.pdf.
163. See Pfizer Inc., F.T.C. No. 0910053 (2010), https:/ANww.ftc.gov/sitest
default/files/documents/cases/2010/01/100129pwyethdo.pdf.
164. See Novartis AG, F.T.C. No. 1210144 (2012), https:/ANww.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/document/cases/2012/09/120904novartisdo.pdf.
165. See Pfizer Inc., et al., 135 F.T.C. 608 (2003).
166. See Actavis Grp. hf, supra note 83 (giving Respondent thirty days to assign the
Supply Agreement to the Acquirer of Isradipine Assets).
167. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, et al., supra note 114 (requires Respondents Sanofi-
Synthlabo and Aventis to divest all manufacturing facilities and other assets used to produce
Arixtra to GlaxoSnithK line).
168. See Cephalon, Inc., 138 F.T.C. 583 (2004) (requiring Cephalon to effect transfers of
licenses and technology to enable Barr Laboratories to be able to compete more aggressively
in the market for breakthrough cancer pain drugs).
169. See Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd., F.T.C. No. 1110166 (July 2, 2012), https://www.
2016 53
Annals of Health Law
services to the buyer in order to assist the buyer manufacture and sell products
successfully.170 Another required the manufacture of a specific product for a
set number of years for the third party to sell in the U.S., a provision designed
to expedite drug entry as an additional competitor.171 One required a supply
and transition services agreement for the supply of the product for a set
number of years while the divestiture buyer obtained the necessary approvals
from the FDA.172 Another required a contract for the manufacture of certain
ingredients until the divestiture buyer obtained the necessary approvals and
supply sources to make the ingredients.173 One order required the company
to provide necessary assistance to the divestiture buyer to complete clinical
trials.174 Others required the provision of the finished product for sale to the
divestiture buyer;17 1 payments of costs for the completion of clinical trials;17 1
a short term service agreement with the divestiture buyer in order to 'ensure
the continued performance of development work; _177 the acquirer to
'continue carrying our certain ongoing activities relating to the
commercialization_ of a certain product, including 'manufacturing,
regulatory, clinical, development and marketing activities; _17 the
maintenance of the viability of drugs until the transfer to an FTC-approved
buyer;179 the provision of transitional services to enable parties to complete
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/07/120703tevacephalondo.pdf (respondent
were required to supply Par Pharmaceuticals with generic tablets); Actavis, Inc.,
F.T.C. No. 1310152 (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
131_0152_c4414_actaviswarnerdecisionandorder-publicyversion.pdf.
170. See Perrigo Co., F.T.C. No. 1110083 (June 21, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/document/cases/2012/06/110626perrigodo.pdf.
171. See Grifolis, S.A., F.T.C. No. 1010153 (July 20, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/document/cases/2011/07/110722grifolsdo.pdf (specifying seven years).
172. See Schering-Plough Corp., supra note 115 (specifying two years).
173. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, et al., supra note 114 (requiring Sonofi to manufacture the
active pharmaceutical ingredient until GlaxoSnithK line can manufacture it independently).
174. See id. (specifying three clinical trials).
175. See Baxter Intl Inc., F.T.C. No. 9810002 (Mar. 24, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/1997/03/c3726.do.pdf (stating that Baxter is required to
turn over all finished product to the acquirer).
176. See FTC Order Clears Way for $90 Billion Merger of Pfizer Inc. and Warner-
Lambert Company, FED. TRADE COMMIN (June 19, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-rel eases/2000/06/ftc-order-cl ears-way-90- bill ion- merger- pfizer-i nc-and-warner
(stating that Pfizer is required to pay OSI Pharmaceutical Inc.-s cost for completing clinical
trials for Epidermal Growth Factor receptor tyrosine kinase(EGFr-tk) inhibitor, CP-358,774).
177. Hoechst and Rhone-Poulenc Settle FTC Charges that Merger Would Violate
Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM N (Dec. 7, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/1 999/1 2/hoechst-and-rhone-poul enc-settl e-ftc-charges- rmerger-woul d-vi ol ate.
178. Merger of Zeneca and Astra, Two Significant Suppliers of Pharaceuticals, Cleared
with Conditions, FED. TRADE COMM-N (Mar. 25, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/1 999/03/merger-zeneca-and-astra-two-si gnifi cant-suppliers-
pharmaceuticals.
179. See FTC Places Conditions on Watson Pharraceutical's Proposed Acquisition of
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clinical testing and obtain regulatory approval;180 and technical transfer
assistance.'
H. Intellectual Property
Intellectual property ('IP_) provisions took many forms, likely associated
with the FTC -s concern over pay-for-delay settlement agreements and other
tactics viewed as anticompetitive. Those framed as prohibitions included
prohibiting a party from accepting payments or entering into pay-for-delay
agreementsl 82 and prohibiting the merged company from acquiring exclusive
rights in certain IP and technology related to certain product areas and
technology.1 3
Beyond prohibitions, many of the consent orders required the
relinquishment, assignment, licensing, grant, and renegotiations of IP. 1"
One required the licensing of rights to manufacture and market the authorized
generic version of the drug divested to a third party. 18  A nother required the
license of certain patents to a third party that block the ability to market in
U.S. 186 Others required the assignment of all relevant intellectual property
rights;" the relinquishment of reversionary rights;1" the grant of an
irrevocabl eworldwide license to rights and patentsj oi ntly owned;189 the grant
Actavis, FED. TRADE COMMIN (Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/201 2/1 0/ftc-pl aces-conditi ons-watson-pharmaceuticals-proposed-acquisiti on
('Watson and Actavis must maintain the viability of the drugs until they are transferred to the
FTC-approved buyer.).
180. See FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS, supra note 62, at8('[T]he order requires Schering
and Merck to provide transitional services to enable Opko to complete clinical testing and
obtain regulatory approval to market Rolapitant in the U.S._).
181. See id. at38 ('The order also requires that Sun provide transitional services including
help obtaining necessary FDA approvals and technical transfer assistance._.
182. See id. at 32 ('To preserve competition in the testosterone gel market the order
prohibits Perrigo ... from entering into any:pay-for-delay-arrangements with Abbott. _.
183. See id. at 62 ('[Tlhe merged company could not acquire exclusive rights in certain
intellectual property and technology related to chemoresistance gene therapy.).
184. See generally FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS, supra note 62.
185. See id. at 29 ('The order required Valeant... to license to Mylan the rights to
manufacture and market the authorized general version of Efudex.j.
186. See id. at 48 ('The order requires that Amgen license certain patents to Sereno, a
Swiss company developing a TNF inhibitor for use in Europe, that block Sereno-s ability to
market in the U.S.).
187. See id. at 50 ('The order required Glaxo to assign all of its relevant intellectual
property rights and relinquish all of Glaxo-s reversionary rights to GI147211C to Gilead
Sciences._).
188. See id. ('The order required Glaxo to ... relinquish all of Glaxo-s reversionary rights
to GI147211C to Gilead Sciences.).
189. See id. at5l ('Theorder required Pfizerto return its EGFr-tk inhibitor, CP-358,774,
along with its technology and knowhow assets to its development partner OSI, to grant OSI
an irrevocable worldwide licenseto its rights and patentsjointly ownedwith Pfizer. . . ).
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of a non-exclusive license to certain patented technologies essential for
development and commercialization of certain products to all requesters; 19o
and the grant of non-exclusive license of certain technology and patent rights
related to specific therapies.191
One detail ed consent order requi red the renegotiation of li cense and supply
agreements with a third party to allow that third party to operate as an
independent competitor by eliminating control over the product restricting
the type of information obtainable about the drug, and allowing the third
party to compete in the development of another product.192 Another required
changing the licensing agreement for specific products and eliminating
reporting arrangements to assure that the acquirer does not obtain
competitively-sensitive information.193 Y et another required the acquirer to
license product formulations and production technology to a third party
within a specific timeframe. 194 Finally, one required the relinquishment of
any claim to first-filer marketing exclusivity.19 s
I. Confidentiality
One consent order required the maintenance of confidentiality of all
marketing information for a specific product.19 6
190. See id. at 61 (noting that Novartis 'was required to grant to all requesters a non-
exclusive license to certain patented technologies essential for development and
commercialization of gene therapy products-).
191. See id. ('Novartis also was required to grant a non-exclusive license of certain
technology and patent rights related to specific therapies for cancer, GV HD, and hemophilia
to a Cornmission-approved licensee.).
192. See id. at 46 ('The order requires Pharmacia to renegotiate its license and supply
agreement with Novartis to allow Novartis to operate as an independent competitor by
eliminating the control Pfizer would have over Novartis-s product, restricting the type of
information Pfizer would be able to obtain about Deramaxx, and allowing Novartis to compete
with Pfizer in the development of a second generation canine arthritis product._.
193. See id. at 55 ('The order required changing the licensing agreement for cytokines
and eliminating reporting arrangements to assure that American Home Products does not
obtain competitively-sensitive information._).
194. See id. at 56 ('The order required [Marion Merrell Dow, Inc.] to license dicyclomine
formulations and production technology to a third party within 12 months. . . .).
195. FTC Settles Charges That Actavis-s Proposed $8.5 Billion Acquisition of Warner
Chilcott Would be Anticomrpetitive, FED. TRADE COMMIN (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.
ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-settles-charges-actavis% E2%80%99s-
proposed-85-billion-acquisition ('[T]he proposed order requires Actavis to relinquish its
claim to first filer marketing exclusivity for generic Lo Loestrin FE and Atelvia products to
preserve the incentives of the companies currently leading the patent litigations againstWarner
Chilcott related to those products.). This exclusivity is technically rewarded by the FDA
rather than the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, but the exclusivity similarly acts as a means
to exclude others from the market space for the statutorily-provided 180 days.
196. FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS, supra note 62, at 50-51 ('The order required Warner to
end its co-promotion agreement with Forest, return all confidential information regarding
Celexa to Forest, maintain the confidentiality of all Celexa marketing information .... ).
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J. Competition Restrictions
One consent order prohibited former sales employees involved in
marketing one product from selling another until a certain date.197
K. Miscellaneous
For lack of a unifying theme, the remainder of the consent order
requirementsfell intothe category of miscellaneous. Oneprovided incentives
for one party (the acquirer) to proceed with the development of the other
party-s specific product.198 Another allowed acquisition except for rights to
market or sell a specific product under an existing exclusive distribution
agreement with a third party.1" There was also a restriction 'from reporting
an intra-company transfer price higher than the level set in the order . . . . _200
Subject to product approval, there was a further requirement in this consent
order to 'report its intra-company transfer price at the lowest of either the
I evel set forth i n the order or the lowest pri ce_ sold to any customer until the
set date.20 1 Lastly, one required that the divestiture buyer 'will be able to
enter into employment contracts with key individuals who have experience
relating to_ the product202
IV. IMPLICATIONS GOING FORWARD
This article has attempted to examine some of the drivers and impacts of
bio-pharma consolidation, and identify and characterize requirements on the
industry set forth by the FTC in select consent orders. Recognizing the
inherent limitations of the methodology, the three FTC reports consulted for
this task nonetheless shed some light on the legal assessments conducted on
pre-merger notification submissions to the agency in the bio-pharma realm
Aside from divestiture, the FTC imposes a number of other detailed
limitations and conditions on mergers and acquisitions tailored to each
individual scenario.
197. See id. ('The order required Warner to end its co-promotion agreement with
Forest .. . and prohibited former Warner sales employees involved in marketing Celexa from
selling Zoloft until March 2001._).
198. See id. at 47 ('The order requires Baxter to terminate its co-marketing agreement
with Watson and provides incentives for Baxterto proceed with development of Wyeth-s iron
gl uconate product.).
199. See id. at 54 ('The consent order permitted IVAX to acquire Zenith except for
Zenith-s rights to market or sell verapamil under Zenith-s exclusive distribution agreement
with Searle._).
200. Id. at 63.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 58 (it was required of Allergan to divest the development and distribution
rights, ensure confidential business information would not be obtained by Allergan, and that
Ipsen would be able to enter into employment contracts with key individuals).
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It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether and how FTC scrutiny
of these consolidations has shifted over the decades since enactment of the
H art-S cott- R odi no A ct, or how scrutiny will play out in the future. H owever,
one thing is certain: bi o-pharma consolidation conti nues at a rapid pace.203
Post-2014, there have been many high-profile mergers and acquisitions in the
bio-pharma space.204 For example, on March 2, 2015, Novartis and
GlaxoSmithKline ('GSK_) struck a $28.5 billion deal in which Novartis
acquired GSK S oncology business and became GSK S 'preferred partnerfor
the commercialisation [sic] of its oncology pipeline. 205 Novartis 'transferred
its vaccines division (excluding flu) to GSK._206 The two companies also
entered into a joint venture for over-the-counter ('OTC ) consumer
products. 20 7 In two additional deals, Actavis acquired Allergan for $70.5
billion, on March 17, 2015,208 and Bayer purchased Merck-S OTC business
for $14.2 billion on October 1, 2014.209 TheValeant and Salix transaction in
April 2015210 led to the controversial drug price increase for Isuprel
(i soproterenol hydrochloride) and Ni tropress (ni troprussi de sodium).211
The beauty of a symposium article is that it can raise more questions than
it answers. This article is no exception, and hopefully it fuels more targeted
research into this realm Asan initial matter relating to the current connection
being drawn between bio-pharma consolidation and drug price increases, it
203. Fraser Tennant, Biopharma M&A Expansion to Continue to 2016 Claims
New Report, FINANCIER (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.financieirworldwide.com/fw-news/
2016/1/1 2/bi opharma-ma-expansi on-to-continue-i n-201 6-claims-new-report.
204. See infra Table 3 for a non-exhaustive list of ten of the top reported mergers and
acquisitions occurring after the time periods covered in the three FTC reports. Note that the
FTC 2014 fiscal year captured October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014. Table 3 begins with
October 2014.
205. Miglierini, supra note 15.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Actavis Cormpletes Allergan Acquisition, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 17, 2015, 8:55AM),
http://www.prnewswire.cornnews-releases/actavis-com-pletes-allergan-acquisition-
300051633.htnl. Actavis subsequently changed its name to Allergan. See Neil Haggerty,
Actavis Changes Narre to Allergan After Deal for Botox Maker, WALL STREETi. (June 15,
2015, 8:19 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/actavis-changes-name-to-allergan-after-deal-
for-botox-maker-1434370774.
209. Bayer Closes Acquisition of Consumer Care Business of Merck & Co., Inc., United
States, For USD 14.2 Billion, BAYER AG (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.press.bayer.comf
baynews/baynews.nsf/id/EABBB3702F83BB71Cl257D640043A0DA/$File/2014-
0328E.pdf?open& mod=05.01.2016_02:34:34.
210. Valeant Pharaceuticals International, Inc. Completes Acquisition of Salix
Pharaceuticals, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 1, 2015, 9:00AM), http://www.prnewswire.comnews-
releases/valeant-pharmaceuticals-international-inc-completes-acquisition-of-salix-
pharrmceuticals-300059279.htd.
211. Rockoff & Silverman, supra note 6 (stating that the list price of Isuprel had increased
from $215.46 to $1,346.62 and the list price of Nitropress had increased from $257.80 to
$805.61).
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remains to be seen whether and how C ongress, and the states, will implement
legislation regarding drug-pricing practices and transparency. Also ripe for
further consideration is how the FTC might more rigorously incorporate
concerns about future drug pricing into their consolidation assessments and
consent orders. Finally, it is worth delving into much more analysis of the
available adjudication and consent orders in the bio-pharma sector to inform
discussions about rectifying perceived shortcomings in the current system set
forth by law and FT C policy.
TABLE 3: RECENT MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS - A HUMBLE SAMPLE
(OCTOBER 2014-] ULY 2015)
Companies Brief Date Value Product
Description Division(s)
Hikma Hikma acquired B- July 28, $2.65 B" Generic drugs
Pharmaceuticals I-s U.S. specialty 2015
Plc (Germany) & generic drugs
B oehri nger busi ness
Ingelheim
(Germany)'
Teva Teva acquired July 27, $40.5 B Generic drugs
Pharmaceutical Allergan-s generic 2015
Industries busi ness
(Israel) &
Allergan
(Ireland)"'_
Celgene Corp. Celgene acquired July 14, $7.2 B Autoimmune
(NJ) & Receptos, R eceptos 2015 drugs
Inc. (CA)iv
AstraZeneca AstraZeneca July 9, $215 M Entocort
(Sweden) & divested global 2015 (gastroenterology
Tillotts Pharma rights, outside the treatment)
AG (UK)v US, of Entocort to
Tillotts
Valeant (Canada) Valeant acquired Apr. 1, $11 B Gastroenterology
& Salix Salix 2015 treatments
Pharmaceuticals
(NC)vi
Actavis (Ireland) Actavis acquired Mar. $66-$70.5 Generic, OTC,
& Allergan Allergan 17, B and brand drugs;
(Ireland)vii 2015 biologics
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Table 3 References:
This table is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of mergers and acquisitions.
Inforration was collected from results of a broad search of the press and corporate press
releases conducted in July 2015.
i Hikrm to Buy Boehringer's U.S. Generics Unit for $2.65 Billion, REUTERS U uly 28, 2015,
3:25 AM), http://www.reuters.comarticle/us-hikma-pharma-m-a-
idUSK CNOQ20G F20150728.
ii Id.
iii Tova Cohen & Steven Scheer, Teva to Buy Allergan Generic Business for $40.5 Billion,
Drops Mylan Bid, REUTERS (July 27, 2015, 6:13 PM), http://www.reuters.comarticle/us-
allergan-m-a-teva-pharm-ind-idUSKCNOQ10QE20150727; seealsoJessica Merrill, Teva
Gets WhatIt Wants - Allergan Generics, Not Mylan, 77 THE PINK SHEET 1, 4(2015). Teva
dropped its pursuit to acquire Mylan-s business to pursue this acquisition instead. Id. This
acquisition will makeTeva the world-s number 1 maker of generic drugs. Id.
iv Bill Berkrot, Celgeneto Buy Receptosfor $7.2 Billion; Gains Promising Drug, REUTERS
( uly 14, 2015, 7:21 PM), http://www.reuters.comarticle/us-receptos-m-a-celgene-
idUSKCNOPO2OB20150714; see alsoJ essica Merrill, Celgene Sets Sights on Becoming
Inflarrmtion and Irmunology Power Player, 77 THE PINK SHEET 1, 4 (2015). About two
thirds of Celgene-s sales in 2014 came from the single product Revlimid. Teresa Rivas,
Celgene Stock Is a Buy as Receptos Deal Is a Winner, BARRON s ( uly 15, 2015),
http://www.barrons.comarticles/celgene-stock-is-a-buy-as-receptos-deal-is-a-winner-
1436985254.
v AstraZeneca Sharpens Focus on Main Therapy Areas Through Agreement with
Gastroenterology Specialist Tillotts Pharrm for Entocort, ASTRAZENECA ( uly 9, 2015),
http://www.astrazeneca.se/pressrumpressmeddelanden-och-nyheter/Article/20150709--
astrazeneca-and-tillotts-pharma.
Novartis Novartis acquired Mar. 2, $16 B Oncology
(Switzerland) & GSK-s oncology 2015 (GSK pipeline
GSK (UK)viii business; GSK oncology) compounds, non-
acquired Novartis- ; $7.1 B influenza
non-influenza (Novartis vaccines
vaccine business; vaccine).x
OTC joint-venture
createdix
Mylan (NV) & Mylan acquired Feb. 27, $5.3 Bxii Generic drugsxiii
Abbott Abbott 2015
Laboratories
(I L)x
Merck (NJ) & Merck acquired Jan. 21, $8.4 Bx- Antibiotics
Cubist Cubist 2015 (antibiotic-
Pharmaceuticals resistant disease
(NJ )xiv I focus)"
Bayer (Germany) Bayer acquired Oct. 1, $14.2 B OTC consumer
& Merck(NJ)x" Merck-s OTC 2014 care
business.
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vi Valeant Pharaceuticals International, Inc. Completes Acquisition of Salix
Pharaceuticals, supra note 210.
vii Actavis Completes Allergan Acquisition, supra note 208. This acquisition created one of
the world's top 10 pharrmaceutical companies by sales revenue, with anticipated revenue of
more than $23 billion for 2015. Id. The deal was widely viewed as a moveto block Valeant
Pharrmaceuticals International's hostile bid for Allergan. Kevin McCoy, Actavis Completes
$66B Deal for Allergan, USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2015,1:09 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/03/17/actavis-allergan-acquistion-
completed/24897595/.
viii Novartis Announces Completion of Transactions with GSK, NOVARTIS (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://www.novartis.com/news/media-releases/novartis-announces-completion-transactions-
gsk.
ix GSK Completes Major Three-PartTransaction with Novartis, GLAXOSMITHK LINE (Mar.
2, 2015), https://www.gsk.comen-gb/m-edia/press-releases/2015/gsk-completes-major-three-
part-transaction-with-novartis/.
x Novartis Announces Completion ofTransactions with GSK, supra note viii. GSK acquired
Novartis non -influenza vaccines business and a joint venture was created between Novartis
OTC and GSK Consumer Healthcare. Novartis owns a 36.5% share of the joint venture. Id.
xi Mylan Cormpletes Acquisition of Abbott's Non-U.S. Developed Markets Specialty and
Branded Generics Business, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 27, 2015, 12:30 PM),
http://www.prnewswire.cornnews-releases/mylan-completes-acquisition-of-abbotts-non-us-
developed-markets-specialty-and-branded-generics-busi ness-300042793.htm.
xii Samantha Sharf, Mylan to Acquire Non-U.S. Business from Abbott for $5.3 Billion,
FORBES U uly 14, 2014,10:25 AM),
http://www.forbes.comsites/samanthasharf/2014/07/14/mylan-to-acquire-non-u-s-business-
from-abbott-for-5-3-billion/#104bba473c36.
xiii Id.
xiv Merck Completes Tender Offer to Acquire Cubist, MERCK UJan. 21, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://www.mercknewsroomcon/news-release/corporate-news/merck-completes-tender-
offer-acquire-cubist.
xvJ ohn Waggoner, Merck Buying Cubist Pharrmceuticals for $8.4B, USA TODAY (Dec. 8,
2014, 2:05 PM), http:/ANww.usatoday.commoney/
xvi Id.
xvii Bayer Closes Acquisition of Consurmer Care Business of Merck & Co., Inc., United
States, for USD 14.2 Billion, BAYER (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.press.bayer.com/baynews/baynews.nsf/id/Bayer-closes-acquisition-consumer-
business-Merck-Co-Inc-United-States-US D-bi Ilion.
xviii Id. This is the second largest acquisition in Bayer-s history. Mark Strobel, Further
Industry Consolidation: Bayer Buys Merck & Co-s Consumer Health Unit, EUROMONITOR
INTERNATIONAL (May 6, 2014), http://blog.eurormonitor.com/2014/05/further-industry-
consolidation- bayer- buys- merck-cos-consurmer- health-unit. html.
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